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I.

HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION

Lawrence Tate was riding his bicycle home from work when a
car ran a stop sign and struck him. Mr. Tate retained an attorney,
James Olsen, to bring a personal injury claim against the driver of
the car for injuries suffered in the accident. But because the
attorney failed to file the lawsuit in a timely manner, the claim
against the driver was forever barred by the statute of limitations.
Instead, Mr. Tate hired another attorney and filed a
malpractice claim against Mr. Olsen. Unfortunately, shortly after
filing the malpractice claim against Mr. Olsen, Mr. Tate died in a
plane crash while returning from a business trip.
Under Minnesota law, two legal claims survive Mr. Tate’s
death: (1) a claim which can be filed against the airline for his
death in the crash under Minnesota’s so-called “wrongful death
1
statute,” and (2) the malpractice claim against Mr. Olsen.
Because Mr. Tate died in the plane crash, a claim is allowed to
proceed under the wrongful death statute. Actions brought under
the wrongful death statute are guided through each step of the
adjudicative process because Minnesota has a rule that establishes
2
the procedure for the continuance of wrongful death claims. The
wrongful death claim will have a much simpler path to follow to
resolution than the malpractice action, for the personal
1. See infra Part II.A for a discussion on why Mr. Tate’s original claim against
the driver for injuries suffered in the bicycle accident would not survive his death.
2. See infra Part V.A.
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representative appointed on behalf of Mr. Tate, for any attorneys,
and for the court involved in the case.
Pursuant to both statutory and common law in Minnesota, the
3
malpractice claim will “survive” the death of the claimant. But in
contrast to claims filed under the wrongful death statute, there is
no rule governing the procedure for pursuing actions that
continue under the “survival statute.” Consequently, there is much
confusion for the parties and court officials involved with Mr.
Tate’s malpractice action.
Several things may cause confusion in a survival action. For
example, it is possible that only the attorney will know of a pending
action at the death of his client. If this is the case, how does the
probate court learn of the action? How, and from whom, does an
attorney receive compensation for handling a survival action? Who
notifies the district court of the death of a party? How does the
district court in which the action is pending learn of the
appointment of a personal representative?
Professional
responsibility rules require an attorney to diligently handle a
4
matter to its conclusion.
An attorney is also required to
communicate regarding issues to be decided by the client,
5
including evaluation of settlement offers. How can an attorney
comply with rules and procedures if she is not sure who the client is
after the client has died but before a personal representative is
appointed? Who is authorized to accept a settlement on behalf of
the decedent? These are but a few of the questions that arise when
a party dies before the completion of an action but the action still
survives under Minnesota law. These issues could be resolved with
the enactment of a procedure to be followed by parties, attorneys,
and court officials when a party dies before the action being
resolved.
To avoid the issues shown above, Minnesota would benefit
from the adoption of a clear procedure for the continuance of a
cause of action which falls under Minnesota’s survival statute
similar to the rule governing an action brought under the wrongful
6
death statute.
3. See MINN. STAT. § 573.01 (2006). See also Johnson v. Taylor, 435 N.W.2d
127 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
4. See MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2005).
5. See id. R. 1.4 (2005).
6. In order to clarify which actions are being discussed, this Note will use the
term “wrongful death action” for actions filed after the death of the injured
person that are based on the cause of the death as filed under Minnesota Statutes
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This Note uses the procedure governing wrongful death
actions to demonstrate how legal practitioners would benefit from
a similar procedure governing survival actions. This Note first
explores the history of the substantive law pertaining to personal
injury litigation, including wrongful death actions, to demonstrate
the divergent paths to be taken procedurally for the two possible
7
causes of action brought on behalf of Mr. Tate. It then explains
how the law evolved from a complete bar on actions brought on
behalf of another person to statutorily allowing them to continue
8
in certain prescribed circumstances.
Part III addresses how Minnesota’s survival statute has evolved
since its original enactment when Minnesota was still a territory to
9
its current form. The discussion on Minnesota’s survival statute
uses an actual case to show the confusion surrounding jurisdiction
over a survival action.
Part IV defines the probate court’s role in a survival action and
compares the jurisdictional issues between the probate court and
district court in handling a present action after a party dies without
complete adjudication of the matter. Parts V and VI analyze the
10
jurisdictional issues.
Finally, Part VII offers a solution to the
jurisdictional conflict between the probate and district court
discussed in Part IV and an explanation why such a solution would
be beneficial to practitioners in Minnesota and the rest of the
11
country.

section 573.02 (also referred to as the “wrongful death statute”). The Note will
use the term “survival action” for actions that survive the death of the party but are
unrelated to the cause of death of the party as filed under Minnesota Statutes
section 573.01 (also referred to as the “survival statute”) (originally drafted as REV.
STAT. MINN., ch. 78, § 3 (1851)).
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part II.C.
9. See infra Part III. While the survival statute allows an action to survive the
death of either the plaintiff or the defendant, this Note is mostly concerned with
actions surviving the death of a plaintiff. Part V.B briefly addresses the procedural
issues surrounding the continuation of a claim in which a defendant dies during
the action.
10. See infra Parts V, VI.
11. See infra Part VII.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss3/1

4

Tymchuck: Note: A Procedural Quagmire: How to Proceed with an Action in Min
14. TYMCHUCK - RC.DOC

2007]

4/10/2007 1:06:23 PM

WHEN A CLIENT DIES EN PENDENTE LITE

1191

II. SUBSTANTIVE LAW RELATED TO PERSONAL INJURY LAW
A. Historical Bar to Actions Resulting in Personal Injury or Death Is
Gradually Reversed
1.

An Action Is Personal to the Claimant

In order to understand how actions survive the death of a party
and to provide a framework in which to analyze a possible
procedure for such actions, it is necessary to understand how the
law and public policy surrounding the abatement, survival, or
transfer of an action evolved. Historically, an action for death or
injury was seen as a personal issue, barring it from the possibility of
12
pursuit by anyone other than the injured (or deceased). The law
gradually recognized actions as separate from the person and
allowed them to proceed on behalf of the deceased’s survivors.
Fears that allowing someone other than an original party to the
action to continue pursuing it would lead to rampant corruption
began to abate. As a result, courts began allowing actions to be
13
assigned to another party who could then pursue the action.
Legislatures passed statutes allowing actions to be pursued after the
death of the party, even when the death was unrelated to the
14
proceeding, by a representative on behalf of the deceased’s estate.
2.

Wrongful Death Actions

Before the nineteenth century, Mr. Tate’s hypothetical action
against the airline would have been barred because the law did not
15
recognize the right to sue for wrongful death.
In early Anglo-Saxon law, homicide—intentional or not—was
considered a civil offense for which the wrongdoer was required to
16
pay the kinsmen of the decedent. In the thirteenth century, a
change in social attitudes led to homicide being viewed as a crime
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. See infra Part II.E.
15. Of course, an even better reason why Mr. Tate’s action against the airline
would not have been sustainable before the nineteenth century is that the Wright
brothers’ famous Kitty Hawk flight did not occur until 1903, making it impossible
for Mr. Tate to even be on a plane before the twentieth century.
16. 1 STUART SPEISER & JAMES E. ROOKS, JR., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
§ 1:3 (4th ed. 2005).
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17

against the state. As a result, private actions by the survivors were
18
barred.
Although personal injury lawsuits began to emerge in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, even as late as the early
19
eighteenth century personal injury litigation was still uncommon.
In cases of domestic injury, the common law only recognized
20
wrongs done to “the superior of the parties related.”
In the early nineteenth century, economic life changed as
21
industrialization led to a separation of work and domestic life. A
new type of personal injury lawsuit began to emerge, which did not
22
Lawsuits
involve a master or his loss of services in a servant.
allowed a laborer incapacitated by injury the possible means to
maintain an income to support his household with an income that
23
was now separate from his employment.
But an off-hand remark indicating that wrongful death claims
were not actionable made by Lord Ellenborough in the 1808
24
English case of Baker v. Bolton put an end to such lawsuits and

17. Id. (citing Gustavus Hay, Jr., Death as a Civil Cause of Action in
Massachusetts, 7 HARV. L. REV. 170, 170–71 (1893)).
18. Id. Because a person’s property was forfeited, it was pointless to sue for a
civil remedy as there was no way to satisfy a civil judgment. Id. (citing T. A.
Smedley, Wrongful Death—Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 605, 611
(1960)).
19. See John Fabian Witt, From Loss of Services to Loss of Support: The Wrongful
Death Statutes, the Origins of Modern Tort Law, and the Making of the Nineteenth-Century
Family, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 717, 722 (2000). The Black Death of the 1340s led
to severe labor shortages in England causing Parliament and courts to develop
ways to protect masters’ rights to the services of their servants. Id. at 723. The
result was allowing a master to seek recovery, in a trespass action, against third
parties who intentionally injured his servant when the injury resulted in the master
losing the services of the injured servant. Id.
20. Id. at 724. In early English law, every man had a “property” right “in the
service of his domestics” so that he could bring an action to recover damages for
the loss of such services. Id. (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES
*429). On the other hand, “the loss of the inferior by such injuries” was
unrewarded. Id. (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *142-43). Thus,
actions against heads of household were barred. Id. at 726.
21. Id. at 727. Before the nineteenth century, the central mode of economic
life was the household structure, which consisted of the master (head of
household), wife, servants, and children such that work, leisure, and domestic life
were all “acted out” in the same place and by the same participants. Id. at 725.
This left little room for litigation over personal injuries within a household. Id. at
726.
22. Id. at 730.
23. Id. at 731.
24. (1808), 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033.
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eventually led to a complete bar on wrongful death actions. Lord
Ellenborough’s remark in Baker has been cited in hundreds of
decisions in the United States courts when referring to wrongful
26
27
death actions and is still mentioned by our highest courts.
Early American courts allowed wrongful death actions before
28
the Baker case. Some jurisdictions in the United States ignored
29
30
Baker, while others followed the English ruling. This split among
jurisdictions created a large amount of litigation in the United
31
States. The divide, coupled with a marked increase in accidents
due to the burgeoning industrial economy, forced states to review
32
their policies on wrongful death actions. Massachusetts enacted
25. Id. (noting that in an action for the death of a man’s wife in a stage coach
accident, when applying the felony-merger doctrine “[i]n a civil court, the death
of a human being could not be complained of as an injury”).
26. SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 16, § 1:2. See also Mobile Life Ins. Co. v.
Brame, 95 U.S. 754, 757 (1877) (holding that the life insurance company was not
able to recover from the defendant, even though the defendant was responsible
for the insured’s death).
27. SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 16, § 1:2. See also Smith v. Whitaker, 734 A.2d
243, 248 (N.J. 1999) (stating that the principle that no civil remedy was available at
common law for a personal injury resulting in death is traceable to Baker).
28. See Witt, supra note 19, at 731–33. See also Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90,
1794 WL 198, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1794) (allowing husband to recover
damages when surgeon operated unskillfully on his wife, causing her death).
29. See, e.g., LaFage v. Jani, 766 A.2d 1066, 1076 (N.J. 2001) (stating that New
Jersey recognized common-law wrongful death action before passing its statute in
1848); Shields v. Yonge, 1854 WL 1606, at *6 (Ga. 1854) (allowing a father to sue
for damages after the death of his minor son).
30. See, e.g., Eden v. Lexington & Frankfort R.R., 53 Ky. 204 (1853)
(explaining that, although Connecticut and New Hampshire enacted statutes to
allow for actions in wrongful death, nothing in Kentucky had changed the
common-law rule that a “cause of action for injuries to the person dies with the
person injured,” so an action brought by a widow against a railroad for the loss of
her husband was barred); Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. 475, 478 (1848)
(holding that, according to the decision set forth in Baker, an action brought by a
widow against a railroad corporation to recover damages for the loss of her
husband due to the careless actions of the railroad could not be maintained).
31. See Witt, supra note 19, at 733. See also Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 894,
896 (D. Me. 1825) (holding that a party with an interest in the services of one who
is injured may sue for compensation so long as he can prove either “actual
damage” or that allowing such action is the intent of the law); Shields, 1854 WL
1606, at *5 (ruling common-law actions for wrongful death allowed so long as they
do not involve felony homicide).
32. See Witt, supra note 19, at 733. See also Needham v. Grand Trunk Ry., 38
Vt. 294 (1865) (explaining that Vermont passed a wrongful death statute in 1849
in response to the numerous deaths resulting from wrongful acts committed and
suffered, which cost the survivor the loss of the “natural support and protection”
of the deceased, and for which the common law failed to provide a remedy to any
survivors).
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the first wrongful death statute in the United States that inverted
the previous model of common-law personal injury litigation, no
longer limiting actions to compensation for heads of household,
but allowing recovery to support widows and minor children
33
dependent on the laborers’ wages.
Other states followed
34
Massachusetts and enacted wrongful death statutes, recognizing a
new model of family and leading to protections for the family unit
35
These statutes typically
organized around male wage earners.
provided for the recovery of damages in cases of death “caused by
wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or default is
such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party
36
injured to maintain an action” and recover damages. By 1869,
twenty-nine of thirty-seven states had enacted wrongful death
37
statutes and today all fifty states have enacted statutes allowing
38
wrongful death actions. The majority of these statutes allow an
33. 1840 MASS. ACTS 224. The Massachusetts Act stated that if the negligence
of a common carrier led to the death of a passenger, the carrier would be held
liable and fined accordingly. See also Witt, supra note 19, at 733–34.
34. See Witt, supra note 19, at 734–35. The newly enacted American wrongful
death statutes were modeled on the private tort model of the Lord Campbell’s Act
enacted by English Parliament. Id. Lord Campbell’s Act overturned the commonlaw rule set forth in Baker which barred liability in tort for killing another. Id.
35. Id. at 720. Wrongful death statutes were based increasingly on the family
paradigm in which husband worked and wife was separated from the market and
relegated to domestic roles. Id. A wife could bring an action for the wrongful
death of her husband, but no such remedy was available to a husband. Id. For a
discussion on the unequal treatment of gender in tort law, see generally Witt,
supra note 19 (analyzing the change in tort law as household structures and values
changed and concluding that tort law has played a substantial role in defining
gender and family roles); see also Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep
Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463 (1998) (arguing that tort law devalues
or undervalues the lives, activities, and contributions from women and people of
color). For a discussion on the evolution of loss of consortium claims brought by
the surviving partner in a same-sex relationship, see John G. Culhane, A “Clanging
Silence”: Same-Sex Couples and Tort Law, 89 KY. L.J. 911 (2001) (stating that because
courts are reluctant to recognize that same-sex couples have intimate
relationships, courts fail to recognize a right to recover for a loss of that intimacy).
For an analysis of the changes, both at common law and legislatively, to wrongful
death laws related to causes of action filed by same-sex partners, see John G.
Culhane, Even More Wrongful Death: Statutes Divorced from Reality, 32 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 171, 177–80 (2005) (discussing a recent California case in which a lesbian
woman was granted standing to bring a wrongful death lawsuit on behalf of her
deceased partner, which prompted California’s legislature to amend its wrongful
death statute to allow actions brought by a surviving same-sex partner).
36. See Witt, supra note 19, at 734.
37. Id. at 736.
38. SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 16, § 1:11 (stating “[a]t the present time
there are statutes in all American states that create a right to recover for wrongful
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action to be filed to recover damages so as to compensate the “next
39
of kin” for the loss of the decedent.
B. Minnesota’s Wrongful Death Statute
Minnesota’s wrongful death statute was enacted when
40
It authorized the decedent’s
Minnesota was still a territory.
personal representative to seek recovery for the exclusive benefit of
the widow and next of kin and distribute it in proportion to the rest
41
of the decedent’s property.
In early wrongful death actions, the sole purpose of recovery
was compensation of the surviving beneficiaries for pecuniary
42
losses. Therefore, an action was not maintainable if there was no
43
The Minnesota
surviving spouse or next of kin of decedent.
Supreme Court overturned this rule in Johnson v. Consolidated
Freightways, Inc. when it held that a trustee may recover on behalf of
44
the beneficiary’s estate.
Later amendments provided
maintenance of the action by a court-appointed trustee with
distribution of damages proportionate to the pecuniary loss
45
severally suffered by the death.
Minnesota’s current wrongful
death statute reads: “[w]hen death is caused by the wrongful act or
omission of any person or corporation, the trustee appointed . . .
may maintain an action therefor if the decedent might have
maintained an action, had the decedent lived, for an injury caused
46
by the wrongful act or omission.”
The current statute would permit Mr. Tate’s wrongful death
action (described in the introduction to this Note) to proceed
against the airline with the appointment of a trustee to pursue the
interests of Mr. Tate’s beneficiaries as specified in Minnesota’s

death”).
39. See Witt, supra note 19, at 736.
40. REV. STAT. TERR. MINN., ch. 78, § 3 (1851) ( “When the death of one is
caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representatives of
the former, may maintain an action against the latter, if the former might have
maintained an action, had he lived, against the latter, for an injury caused by the
same act or omission . . . .”).
41. Id.
42. Johnson v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 608, 611 (Minn. 1988).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 613 (stating that damages are limited to the pecuniary losses based
on the time between the injury to the victim and his death).
45. 1905 MINN. REV. LAWS, ch. 87, § 2.
46. MINN. STAT. § 573.02, subdiv. 1 (2006) (emphasis added).
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47

wrongful death statute.

C. Historical Analysis of Assignability
Mr. Tate’s action for malpractice would not have survived in
the courts before the mid-nineteenth century, because there was a
complete bar on assigning or transferring causes of action between
48
parties. The evolution of assignability of claims shows the shift in
legal thinking regarding the existence of a claim independent from
the claimant.
1.

The English Legal System: Prohibitions on Personal Actions

Claims that had to be asserted by action in the early courts,
termed “choses in action,” included rights to debts, contract
damages, rights arising from torts, and rights in personal
49
Because they involved personal rights, it followed
property.
logically that these personal actions could not be assigned to
50
another person.
And in fact, due to abuses of the court system, assignment of
personal claims even came to be banned outright. In the medieval
English courts, because of the inability of the courts to self-regulate,
51
bribery of both judges and juries led to widespread corruption. It
was consequently possible for litigants from aristocratic families to
carry out their feuds with other aristocracy through the courts,
52
attempting to consolidate larger estates.
By assisting others in
suits for recovery of land, they could take an interest in the land in

47. Id. Upon written petition by the surviving spouse or next of kin, the court
having jurisdiction over the action appoints a trustee to commence or continue
the action and obtain recovery of damages. Id. § 573.02, subdiv. 3. The full
procedure governing a wrongful death action is described infra Part V.A.
48. See Kevin Pennell, On the Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims: A
Contractual Solution to a Contractual Problem, 82 TEX. L. REV. 481, 483 (2003)
(explaining that a chose in action is a right to receive debts or damages, and rights
were considered personal and non-transferable to others).
49. W.S. Holdsworth, The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the
Common Law, 33 HARV. L. REV. 997, 997–98 (1920) (detailing the history of the
treatment of choses in action by the common law).
50. Id. at 1016. An assignment is “[t]he transfer of rights or property.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 128 (8th ed. 2004).
51. See Patrick T. Morgan, Unbundling Our Tort Rights: Assignability for Personal
Injury and Wrongful Death Claims, 66 MO. L. REV. 683, 691 (2001) (illuminating the
multitude of problems with the complex and corrupt medieval courts).
52. Id.
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53

return. The practice of holding such land interests was known as
54
champerty. Another practice, maintenance, allowed feudal lords
to support and uphold their tenants’ lawsuits, clogging the courts
55
as a means to carry on their disputes with other lords.
Besides overwhelming the courts, the use of maintenance and
champtery in assisting with litigation became disfavored as un56
Christian.
Legislation and common law responded with
prohibitions of these practices, attempting to relieve the overused
57
judicial system. And the law came to forbid in general the
assignment of so-called “personal actions,” thus allowing the
judiciary to rid itself of the corruption that had become associated
58
with these actions through maintenance and champtery.
2. History of Assignments in the United States: From Complete Bar to
Dependence on Type of Cause of Action
The prohibitions on champerty and maintenance gained a
different use in American law as a means to protect important
sources of economic growth—such as railroads—by barring claims
59
from those who could ill-afford to withstand the cost of litigation.
Early English common law stated that “no man could purchase
60
another’s right to a suit, either in whole or in part.” American
courts followed England and based their decisions disallowing
assignments on the public policy concern that courts should not be

53. Id.
54. Id. The modern definition of champerty is “[a]n agreement between an
officious intermeddler in a lawsuit and a litigant by which the intermeddler helps
pursue the litigant's claim as consideration for receiving part of any judgment
proceeds.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 246 (8th ed. 2004).
55. See Morgan, supra note 51, at 692.
The modern definition of
maintenance refers to “[a]ssistance in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit given to
a litigant by someone who has no bona fide interest in the case; meddling in
someone else's litigation." BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 973 (8th ed. 2004).
56. See Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48, 58 (1935)
(explaining that a litigious spirit did not coincide with the Christian spirit of
charity). Use of the judicial system to protect one’s rights was acceptable, but use
of those same courts in order to intervene in litigation on another’s behalf was
deemed meddling. Id.
57. See 7 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 523–24
(Methuen & Co. Ltd. & Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 1937) (1925) (stating that most
statutes have consolidated champerty and maintenance).
58. See Morgan, supra note 51, at 693.
59. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
UNITED STATES 6–10 (3d ed. 1999). See also Radin, supra note 56, at 65–66.
60. Lytle v. State, 17 Ark. 608, 627 (1857).
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used to enforce any action that hinted at maintenance and
61
Many courts believed that this prohibition spared
champerty.
individuals who suffered a personal tragedy the intrusion of others
62
seeking to purchase their tort claim.
3.

The Policy Changes: What Type of Claim Is It?

In the early twentieth century, maintenance gradually ceased
to be a reason to object to the assignment of an action and the
63
complete bar on assignments increasingly became reversed.
Advancing conditions of commercial interests and a burgeoning
economy led the judiciary and legislatures to modify the flat
64
prohibition on assignments. Courts also stated that the original
laws barring champerty and maintenance were intended to prevent
the interference of strangers in an action, but that those who agree
to aid a party to an action should not be regarded as committing
65
unlawful maintenance.
61. See Morgan, supra note 51, at 695. American courts still use the so-called
dangers of champerty and maintenance as justifications to prevent assignments.
See also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Vaccari, 310 Minn. 97, 100–01, 245 N.W.2d 844,
846 (1976) (stating that subrogation does not create the same risk of champerty
and maintenance as does assignment).
62. See Peck v. Heurich, 167 U.S. 624, 630 (1897) (explaining that if
assignment was permitted, the judiciary would soon be overcome with “baseless
litigation” and lead to lawyers who speculate, and hence gamble, on the outcome
of a suit). See also Huber v. Johnson, 68 Minn. 74, 77–79, 70 N.W. 806, 807–08
(1897) (stating that prohibition against champerty and maintenance was to
“prevent officious intermeddlers from stirring up strife . . . or speculative litigation
which would . . . lead to corrupt practices and pervert the remedial process of the
law”). This fear of corruption or perversion of the process of law can still be seen
in laws regulating the solicitation of clients. See MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 7.3 (2005). In addition, “ambulance chaser” generally is a derogatory term for
one who solicits cases for an attorney in return for a percentage of the recovery.
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 88 (8th ed. 2004).
63. Bouvier v. Baltimore & N.Y. Ry. Co., 51 A. 781, 785 (N.J. 1902) (stating
that maintenance was “entirely the creature of English statutory law, and of the
judicial construction of such law, and . . . there existed no rational ground for the
contention that any part of the law of maintenance in any form remained in
force”).
64. Hillsdale Distillery Co. v. Briant, 129 Minn. 223, 226, 152 N.W. 265, 266
(1915). Courts have stated that experience has shown that no evil results from the
assignment of rights of action but, in fact, the public good is greatly promoted by
the free circulation of property in action, as well as of property in possession. See
Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 3 Cow. 623 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824).
65. Thallhimer, 3 Cow. at 623 (holding that an agreement between the
plaintiff and a third party with regard to the action was not void within the
provisions of the act prohibiting champerty and maintenance and should be
upheld).
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Most states modified the common-law rule to allow actions that
66
survive the death of the holder to be assigned. The apprehension
that “justice would be trodden down” if an action was transferred
67
was no longer considered valid. The evolution of society reached
a point that the harms associated with champerty and maintenance
68
were effectively controlled by other measures. American courts
began to recognize that the evils of assigning a claim were no
69
longer relevant and started allowing assignment.
D. Minnesota’s Stance on Assignment
Minnesota allows assignment of an action if the action meets
70
The relationship between the
the statutory survival test.
survivability of a claim and its assignability appears to stem from
71
dictum in the case of Comegys v. Vasse. In Comegys, the United
States Supreme Court stated that because personal tort claims
72
abated at the death of the owner, they were not assignable. But
other causes of action, that survive the death of the victim, may be
73
assigned.
Minnesota expressly addresses the assignment or transfer of an

66. See Isaac Marcushamer, Selling Your Torts: Creating a Market for Tort Claims
and Liability, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1543, 1553 (2005).
67. Winn v. Ft. Worth & R.G. Ry. Co., 33 S.W. 593, 594 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896).
The bar on assignments rule was never followed in the courts of equity as it was
deemed unjust. Id.
68. See Marcushamer, supra note 66, at 1553. Such safeguards include causes
of action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process, and sanctions for those
found to be instituting or maintaining frivolous actions. Susan Lorde Martin,
Financing Plaintiffs’ Lawsuits: An Increasingly Popular (and Legal) Business, 33 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 83–84 (2000). In addition, lawyers are bound by
professional rules of conduct that disallow excessive fees, and the doctrines of
unconscionability, duress, and good faith establish standards of behavior for those
entering into contracts for the support of litigation. Id.
69. See Marcushamer, supra note 66, at 1553–54.
70. See Regie De L'Assurance Auto. Du Quebec v. Jensen, 399 N.W.2d 85, 89
(Minn. 1987) (stating that an action is assignable if it meets the survivability test
under Minnesota Statutes section 573.01 (1986)); Jandera v. Lakefield Farmers
Union, 150 Minn. 476, 479, 185 N.W. 656, 658 (1921) (stating that Minnesota
abrogated the common-law rule by allowing all causes of action to survive except
those arising out of an injury to the person); Peterson v. Brown, 457 N.W.2d 745,
748 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming that assignability of an action is governed by
Minnesota Statutes section 573.01 (1990)).
71. 26 U.S. 193 (1828).
72. Id. at 213.
73. Id. (stating that claims arising out of property may be assigned).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 1
14. TYMCHUCK - RC.DOC

1200

4/10/2007 1:06:23 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3

74

action by statute. A plaintiff who was assigned a cause of action
75
may continue the action for the benefit of the assignee. But the
Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled that an assignment of a cause
of action for personal injury, and by extension a wrongful death
76
action, is prohibited.
According to the court in Peterson v. Brown, the following
actions are assignable: fraud and misrepresentation, claimed
violations of a property right, negligence claims, and breach of
77
contract claims.
E. From Wrongful Death to Survival Statutes
Just as the wrongful death statute was a response to the general
failure at common law to provide a remedy for wrongful death,
there was a similar common-law failure to provide a remedy to a
person who died before commencing or completing an action
unrelated to the death of the party but which existed at the time of
78
death. Historically, actions for recovery of civil damages would
abate if the “injured” person died before commencement or
79
completion of the action for which he suffered injuries.
States remedied this concern by enacting survival statutes
permitting recovery by a personal representative, usually on behalf
of the estate, for damages the decedent could have recovered had
80
he lived. The test of survivability of the cause of action is usually

74. MINN. STAT. § 540.12 (2006) (originally enacted as Rev. St. (Terr.), c. 70,
§ 37 (1851)). “No action shall abate by reason of the death or disability of a party,
or the transfer of the party’s interest, if the cause of action continues or survives.” Id.
(emphasis added).
75. Aaberg v. Minn. Commercial Men’s Ass’n, 161 Minn. 384, 385, 201 N.W.
626, 627 (1925). Although not addressed in this paper, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has also ruled that a verdict for a personal injury suit is assignable. See Kent
v. Chapel, 67 Minn. 420, 422, 70 N.W. 2, 3 (1897).
76. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Vaccari, 310 Minn. 97, 100–01, 245
N.W.2d 844, 846 (1976) (allowing assignment of rights to medical payments
already made by the tortfeasor but denying assignment of an injured party’s claim
against a tortfeasor who was under no pre-existing duty to compensate the injured
party); see also Regie De L'Assurance Auto. Du Quebec v. Jensen 399 N.W.2d 85, 89
(Minn. 1987) (ruling that an action can only be assigned if it survives to the
personal representative of the deceased, which is inapplicable in a wrongful death
case because the death creates a wrongful death action).
77. 457 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
78. SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 16, § 1:13.
79. Id.
80. See MINN. STAT. § 573.01 (2006).
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81

the nature of the action.

III. MINNESOTA’S SURVIVAL STATUTE
Minnesota law regarding survival actions has seen a gradual
expansion in suits allowed to survive the death of a party. The
original survival statute provided that a cause of action arising out
of an injury to a person died with the death of either the injured
party or the tortfeasor, with the exception of actions for wrongful
82
death. In 1941, the legislature amended the survival statute to
allow causes of action growing out of personal injuries that were
83
the result of the negligence of the decedent.
The legislature extended the survival statute in 1967 to allow
causes of action brought in “strict liability, statutory liability or
84
breach of warranty.” In Wild v. Rarig, the Minnesota Supreme
Court interpreted Minnesota Statutes section 573.01 to mean that
the survival statute was still not applicable “to intentional torts such
85
as assault, battery, and false imprisonment.”
Intentional torts
were barred from survival under section 573.01 until 1982, when
the court ruled that the complete bar on the survival of intentional
torts violated the equal protection provision of the Minnesota
86
Constitution.
A. The Minnesota Supreme Court: Complete Bar on Intentional Torts
Under Survival Statutes Violates Due Process
In Thompson v. Petroff, the court stated that simply because the
Minnesota legislature intentionally excluded intentional torts from
87
the survival statute did not mean it acted rationally in doing so.
The Thompson court stated that prohibiting the survival of
intentional tort actions did not serve any purpose in modern tort
88
law. The only apparent reason for the omission of intentional
81. 1 C.J.S. Abatement and Revival § 147 (2006).
82. 1849 Minn. Laws 403.
83. Lavalle v. Kaupp, 240 Minn. 360, 361–63, 61 N.W.2d 228, 229–30 (1953)
(emphasis added).
84. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.01 (2006).
85. 302 Minn. 419, 446, 234 N.W.2d 775, 792–93 (1975).
86. Thompson v. Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 407 (Minn. 1982).
87. Id. at 404 (stating that both Lavalle and Wild were only concerned with
statutory interpretation and did not address the question of the act’s
constitutionality).
88. Id. at 405 (citing Moyer v. Phillips, 341 A.2d 441, 443–45 (Pa. 1975),
which held tort actions survivable because survival statutes were designed “in
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torts from survival statutes was the “legislature’s failure to keep up
89
with the development of modern tort law.”
90
As stated earlier, historical common-law rules regarding
abatement of tort actions were based on the medieval concept of
revenge. The Minnesota Supreme Court found that these notions
were no longer relevant in the current tort system that provides for
91
compensation, rather than punishment of a tortfeasor.
The
majority in Thompson stated that the distinction between intentional
torts and all other causes of action is not only irrelevant to the
92
statute, but also arbitrary.
Based upon this analysis of the history and purpose of survival
statutes with regard to modern theories of tort law, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the survival statute failed the rational
basis test and violated the equal protection provision of the
93
Minnesota Constitution. The court struck the middle sentence of
section 573.01, effectively allowing all causes of action to survive the
94
death of a party except for those arising out of wrongful death.
The court recognized that Thompson overturned long-standing
common-law principles, as well as current legislation, and noted
95
that such endeavors should not be taken lightly. But the court
96
stated that the current law no longer served societal needs. The
new rule of Thompson was to be applied to all cases after the date of
97
its decision.
B. The Minnesota Legislature Responds
In 1983, the Minnesota Legislature amended the survival
accordance with modern theories of tort law,” which places more stress on
compensatory than punitive damages).
89. Id.
90. See supra Part II.A.
91. See Thompson, 319 N.W.2d at 405.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 406 (stating that because the court held that Minnesota Statute
section 573.01 violated the Minnesota Constitution, it did not need to decide
whether it violated the United States Constitution).
94. Id. at 407 (striking “except a cause of action arising out of bodily injuries
or death caused by the negligence of a decedent”). Wrongful death actions are
governed by Minnesota Statute section 573.02. Id.
95. Id. (recognizing that the effect of the decision overturned “a common-law
rule of long standing and ancient origin” that the Minnesota Legislature adopted
in the nineteenth century).
96. Id. (explaining that the rule should be replaced with one reflecting needs
of people and demands of justice).
97. Id.
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statute to conform to the court’s decision in Thompson and applied
98
the rule to all causes of action arising on or after that date. The
current language of the survival statute states that all causes of
action not arising under the wrongful death statute survive to a
99
personal representative.
As illustrated in the analysis above, wrongful death and survival
statutes differ in theory and practice. Wrongful death statutes
generally create a new cause of action for the death itself and are
100
for the benefit of the heirs of the person killed.
On the other
hand, survival statutes allow actions already commenced at the time
of the person’s death to “survive” her death and continue for the
101
benefit of the decedent’s estate.
IV. THE PROBLEM ILLUSTRATED: MINNESOTA PROBATE
JURISDICTION VERSUS DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION
A. Deciphering Control of the Action
In order to understand the problems that arise due to the lack
of a clear procedure for survival actions, this Note explores the
jurisdictional problem created when a party dies while an action is
still pending. As will be explained, the probate court and the
district court have distinct spheres of jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the Minnesota judiciary was set forth in the
102
Specifically, the Minnesota probate
Minnesota Constitution.
courts have original jurisdiction for “the administration of estates
103
of deceased persons.”
The Minnesota courts are clear that,
98. MINN. STAT. § 573.01 (2006).
99. Id. See also Johnson v. Taylor, 435 N.W.2d 127, 128–29 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989) (providing another example of the Minnesota Supreme Court applying the
revised statute).
100. See SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 16, § 1:13 (citing Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v.
Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974)). See also Martz v. Reviser, 284 Minn. 166, 169, 170
N.W.2d 83, 85 (1969) (stating that “[t]he recovery in such an action . . . shall be
for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin, to be distributed
to them as is personal property of persons dying intestate”); Kuhlne v. Swedlund,
220 Minn. 573, 576, 20 N.W.2d 396, 398 (1945).
101. See SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 16, § 1:13. See also MINN. STAT. § 573.01
(2006); Johnson, 435 N.W.2d at 128 (stating that “there is no reason why an estate
that has been injured or depleted by [the wrong of] another should not be
compensated whether the injured party is living or not”).
102. MINN. CONST. art. VI.
103. MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 11 (formerly MINN. CONST. art VI, § 6). See also
Leslie v. Minneapolis Soc. of Fine Arts, 259 N.W.2d 898, 903 (Minn. 1977)
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according to the Minnesota Constitution and statutory enactment,
probate courts possess exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction that is
104
separate and distinct from the jurisdiction of the district courts.
The principal function of the probate court is to administer a
decedent’s estate by determining who is entitled to share in such
105
estate, and the court’s decree is not subject to collateral attack.
The probate court is granted “all powers, legal or equitable,
essential to a complete exercise of the plenary and exclusive
jurisdiction” provided under Minnesota Constitution article 6,
section 11, as distinct from the general jurisdiction granted to
106
district courts.
On the other hand, the Minnesota Constitution confers
107
original jurisdiction over all civil cases to the district court.
But
this does not include jurisdiction over matters rightly before the
108
probate court.
In Leslie v. Minneapolis Society of Fine Arts, the
Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction possessed by probate courts is “separate and distinct”
109
from the jurisdiction held by the district courts.
Probate courts
have no jurisdiction to consider issues unrelated to the
110
administration, settlement, or distribution of a decedent’s estate.
Therefore, probate courts have no authority to decide an action
rightly pending before a district court, such that district court
jurisdiction in Minnesota remains wholly separate from that
111
granted probate court. The district courts, by statutory direction,
only have appellate jurisdiction over matters pertaining to the
(containing further explanation of the jurisdiction held by Minnesota’s probate
courts).
104. Murray v. Calkins, 191 Minn. 460, 463, 254 N.W. 605, 607 (1934). See also
MINN. STAT. § 524.3-105 (2006).
105. In re Iverson, 249 Minn. 156, 160, 81 N.W.2d 701, 704 (1957).
106. Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 10, 10, 53 N.W.2d 809, 810 (1952).
107. MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
108. See Vesey, 237 Minn. at 13, 53 N.W.2d at 812 (“Since the probate court has
exclusive original jurisdiction to adjudicate and determine whether a person
qualifies as an heir . . . it follows that the district court is wholly without such
original jurisdiction and may not, by injunction or otherwise, impair or otherwise
interfere with the probate court’s original exercise thereof.”).
109. 259 N.W.2d 898, 903 (Minn. 1977).
110. In re Iverson, 249 Minn. at 160, 81 N.W.2d at 704; Leslie v. Minneapolis
Soc. of Fine Arts, 259 N.W.2d 898, 903 (Minn. 1977) (stating it has been
frequently held that probate courts have no “independent jurisdiction in equity or
at law over controversies between the representatives of the estate, or those
claiming under it, with strangers claiming adversely, (or) of collateral actions”);
Wilson v. Erickson, 147 Minn. 260, 261–62, 180 N.W. 93–94 (1920).
111. Leslie, 259 N.W.2d at 903.
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estates of deceased persons, versus original jurisdiction, which is
112
granted to the probate courts.
As will be illustrated and discussed later in this section,
jurisdictcion is an issue for parties deciding how to proceed with
survival actions that are rightly before the district court when the
probate court is tasked with handling the decedent’s estate.
Minnesota’s survival statute specifically states that an action
surviving the death of a party survives to that party’s personal
113
representative, and Minnesota law holds that probate courts have
114
the exclusive power to appoint a personal representative. Before
an action still pending at a party’s death may continue, Minnesota
law dictates that a personal representative must be appointed to
115
administer the estate.
Therefore, if a client dies pending
completion of an action already before the district court, it is up to
the probate court to appoint a personal representative in order to
116
proceed with the action.
The district court does not have the
jurisdiction to appoint a personal representative or to interfere
with the probate court’s ability to administer the decedent’s
117
estate. Therefore, parties to a survival action must deal with both
the probate court and the district court, each with its own distinct
jurisdiction over the matter, neither of which works in conjunction
with the other.
In a survival action, the district court retains exclusive
jurisdiction over the pending action, while the probate court gains
exclusive jurisdiction over administering the decedent’s estate.

112. Iverson, at 160, 81 N.W.2d at 704 (ruling that the district court only has
the right to take a proper appeal after probate court has handled a case because
the district court “has no right to make a determination, in the absence of a
determination of the probate court”). See also In re Hauge’s Estate, 219 Minn. 192,
197, 17 N.W.2d 305, 307 (1945) (stating district court cannot interfere with
constitutional jurisdiction of probate court, except by appellate or remedial
jurisdiction).
113. MINN. STAT. § 573.01 (2006).
114. Id. § 524.3-103 (requiring personal representative to be appointed by
order of the probate court or probate registrar and stating the administration of
the estate is commenced by the issuance of Letters of Administration to the
qualified personal representative). See also Minn. Odd Fellows Home v. Pogue,
245 Minn. 539, 73 N.W.2d 615 (1955); Wilson v. Erickson, 147 Minn. 260, 261, 180
N.W. 93, 93 (1920).
115. MINN. STAT. § 524.3-601 (2006) (providing first that a personal
representative shall qualify by filing a bond and oath of office, or a statement of
acceptance of the duties, with the appropriate court).
116. Id.
117. See Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 10, 13–14, 53 N.W.2d 809, 812 (1952).
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This disconnect between the jurisdiction of the probate court and
the district court has led to a gap in the pursuit of an existing
action that survived the party’s death. The district court handling
118
the action can order a substitution of parties.
But the
substitution of parties requires the appointment of a personal
119
representative, which must be handled in probate court.
Therefore, the district court is paralyzed, and the pending action
stalled, until the probate court takes action.
The paralysis resulting from the separate and distinct spheres
of jurisdiction of the probate and district courts cannot be
overcome by agreement between the parties, as the Minnesota
Supreme Court prohibits parties from consenting to confer control
120
in excess of a court’s jurisdiction.
As a result, the parties in a
survival action cannot agree to submit to probate jurisdiction for
the pending matter nor agree to allow the district court to exercise
jurisdiction over appointing a personal representative. The parties
are, in effect, trapped between the “exclusive jurisdiction” of two
courts, which can be confusing to practicing attorneys attempting
to handle a deceased client’s action properly and expeditiously. A
procedure detailing the proper steps for the attorneys, parties, and
courts to follow would alleviate this confusion and avoid the delay
regarding the surviving action.
B. The Court Reviews the Problem of Jurisdiction: The Case of Milner v.
First Bank of Minneapolis
The jurisdictional conflict between the probate and district
121
courts is illustrated in Milner v. First National Bank of Minneapolis.
In Milner, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided whether survival
statutes or probate statutes governed a contract action that survived
122
the death of a defendant.
In Milner, the plaintiff commenced a breach of contract action,
118. See infra Part V.B.
119. See MINN. STAT. § 524.3-614 (2006).
120. See In re Hudson’s Guardianship, 226 Minn. 532, 539, 33 N.W.2d 848, 854
(1948).
121. 228 Minn. 324, 37 N.W.2d 450 (1949).
122. See id. at 327, 37 N.W.2d at 450. The court compared Minnesota Statutes
section 525.411 (repealed and amended as Minnesota Statutes sections 524.3-803,
-804, -810) with Minnesota Statutes section 525.431 (repealed and amended as
Minnesota Statutes sections 524.3-803, -804, -812), ruling that the action may
proceed to final judgment once the court, on motion, substitutes the defendant’s
representative as the defendant. Id. at 327, 37 N.W.2d at 451.
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but when the defendant died before trial, First National Bank was
appointed executor and the plaintiff moved for substitution of the
123
executor of the estate in place of defendant.
The district court
granted the substitution and First National Bank appealed,
asserting that under the probate statutes, the district court ceased
to have jurisdiction when the defendant died, thus requiring the
124
plaintiff to proceed with the contract action in probate court.
The Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed the issue using the
125
language in Minnesota Statutes sections 573.01 and 540.12.
Section 573.01 states that all causes of action not arising out of
personal injury survive to, and against, the personal representative
126
of the decedent.
Section 540.12 states that if an action survives
the death of a party, it shall not abate by reason of the death of a
party, and that where an action survives, the court, on motion, may
127
substitute the representative.
The court compared sections
573.01 and 540.12 against section 525.43 of the probate code,
which provides that all lawsuits where a cause of action survives may
be prosecuted to completion—despite the death of any party—with
128
the representative being substituted for the deceased party.
The
court stated that unless there was statutory language nullifying the
express language of sections 571.03, 540.12, and 525.43, the cause
of action survived to the plaintiff against the personal
129
representative of the decedent.
The appellant attempted to counter the language in the above
sections by asserting that, under sections 525.411 and 525.431 of
Minnesota’s probate code, the district court’s jurisdiction over a
130
contract dispute ended with the death of the defendant.
The
123. Id. at 325, 37 N.W.2d at 450.
124. Id. at 325–26, 37 N.W.2d at 450. Defendant claimed that Minnesota
Statutes section 525.411 governed the filing of a claim against a decedent’s estate.
Id. Defendant also asserted that Minnesota Statutes section 525.431, which stated
that “no action at law shall lie against a representative for the recovery of money
upon any claim required to be filed by section 525.411” was controlling. Id. at 327,
37 N.W.2d at 451.
125. Id. at 326, 37 N.W.2d at 451. See also MINN. STAT. §§ 573.01, 540.12
(2006).
126. Milner, 228 Minn. at 326, 37 N.W.2d at 451.
127. Id. The court specifically stated that the plaintiff complied with the
requirement for substitution set forth in section 540.12. Id.
128. MINN. STAT. § 525.43 (1970) (repealed and amended as Minnesota
Statutes sections 524.3-803, -806 (2006)).
129. Milner, 228 Minn. at 326, 37 N.W.2d at 451.
130. Id. at 325, 37 N.W.2d at 450. First Bank also stated that, after the
defendant’s death, the plaintiff should have filed the contract claim in probate
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court ruled that sections 525.411 and 525.431 were not applicable
to an action already pending at the time of the defendant’s
131
death.
Nothing in the language of section 525.411 or 525.431
relates to an action already pending at the time of death, so no
conflict existed between the statutes, because section 573.01 gave
the plaintiff “an absolute right” to continue the action after the
132
defendant died. The definite language of survival statutes clearly
authorized the district court to order the substitution and any
other interpretation would lead to “duplication and a multiplicity
133
of actions.”
The ruling in Milner clarified that sections 573.01 and 540.12
govern a survival action with respect to jurisdiction and the
substitution of parties. But it did not clarify the proper procedure
to be followed by the parties in proceeding with such action. Milner
reiterated that the probate court has jurisdiction over a decedent’s
estate while the district court maintains jurisdiction over the
134
pending action.
Milner demonstrates how the separate
jurisdictional spheres of the district and probate courts can cause
confusion and lead to increased litigation to settle a survival action.
While Milner did clarify which statutes apply to survival actions, the
appeal took place after First National was appointed as executor
and the plaintiff had filed a motion to substitute. What happens to
an action after the death but before a party has been substituted?
Parties would benefit from a procedure with clear instructions on
how to proceed in an action pending the death of a party.
V. PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS
A. Procedure for Wrongful Death Claim: Minnesota Rule 144
Minnesota courts and the legislature have clarified the
substantive law of survival actions by stating which actions survive
court because under section 525.431 she had no authority to proceed against the
estate’s representative. Id. at 327, 37 N.W.2d at 451.
131. Id. at 327, 37 N.W.2d at 451 (stating sections 525.411 and 525.423 would
be controlling only if there was no action pending at the time of defendant’s
death).
132. Id. (noting that section 525.43 makes express provision for the
continuation of survival actions and for substituting the representative of the
deceased).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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and in what forum they are litigated. But the procedure for how
these actions continue—exactly what steps should occur when a
plaintiff or defendant dies—is incomplete. In accordance with
section 573.02, Minnesota established a rule of practice governing
135
the procedure for commencing a wrongful death action.
Rule
144 of the Minnesota Rules of General Practice is derived from
Rule 2 of the former Code of Rules for the District Courts and was
adopted shortly after the wrongful death statute itself was made
136
law. According to the rule, an application for the appointment of
a trustee of a wrongful death action under section 573.02 shall be
made by “the verified petition of the surviving spouse or one of the
137
next of kin of the decedent.”
The rule goes on to detail the
138
requirements for inclusion in the petition. The petition required
under Rule 144 is common enough that there is a form available
that allows the trustee to simply fill in the blanks, provide a
139
notarized signature, and file with the appropriate court.
In the next section, the rule states the notice and hearing
140
requirements for appointing a trustee. The rule even goes so far
141
as to state the language to be used in the caption on the petition.
The fourth provision explains the procedure for transferring the
142
action to a different county.
The rule also gives a detailed
procedure for how the trustee shall handle the distribution of any
143
funds recovered in the action.
As noted, Minnesota provides clear guidance on how to
proceed with wrongful death actions. A wrongful death claim
cannot, by definition, be filed until after the death of the injured
person, so the action is not disrupted by death in the way that a
survival action is. A wrongful death action already involves a party
135. See generally MINN. R. GEN. PRACTICE 144 (2006) (giving detailed
explanation of the procedure and timeline for appointing a trustee to represent
the next of kin of the decedent via petition).
136. DAVID F. HERR & LAURIE A. KINDEL, GENERAL RULES OF PRACTICE
ANNOTATED, 3A MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES 267 (2006 ed.).
137. See generally MINN. R. GEN. PRACTICE. 144 (2006).
138. Id. at 144.01 (requiring dates and places of decedent’s birth and death,
name, age, and addresses of decedent’s surviving spouse and next of kin).
139. Miller & Davis Forms, WL database MILDAV, Form No. 3281 (1998).
140. MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 144.02 (2006) (stating that the petition will be heard
upon such notice and in the manner determined by the court unless: (1) waived
by next of kin listed on petition; or (2) court determines it is unnecessary).
141. Id. at 144.03 (quoting “[I]n the matter of the appointment of a trustee for
the next of kin of ____________, Decedent”).
142. Id. at 144.04.
143. Id. at 144.05.
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who is motivated to pursue the claim for her own benefit.
Since
the party pursuing a wrongful death claim will be the one who
potentially benefits from the action, it is a reasonable assumption
that she will keep the action moving forward. On the other hand,
the deceased was the “motivated party” in a survival action. But
after the death, a third party is now required to pursue the action
to conclusion, even though it will benefit the deceased’s estate and
145
not the third party.
This issue is even more drastic if the
decedent is the defendant to an action. In this case, it is likely no
one will be motivated to act as the personal representative to keep
the action moving forward to conclusion. Thus, practitioners
handling a survival action must muddle through a confusing
labyrinth of conflicting statutes and jurisdictional issues.
B. General Procedure When a Party Dies Pending Action (En Pendente
Lite)
1.

Minnesota Rule 25

As described above, Minnesota provides no procedural
guidance on handling an action when a party to that action dies
before its completion. Instead, a lawyer must rely on the rules and
statutes that do exist to decipher how best to continue such an
action on behalf of his client.
Rule 17.02 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure states
that if a party to an action is “incompetent” and has an appointed
representative, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of
the incompetent party. Does the death of a client qualify as his
being incompetent? It is unlikely that a deceased client would be
treated under Rule 17, because a client’s death is dealt with under
Rule 25. But a procedure dealing specifically with handling a
survival action would clarify conflicts between different Rules.
The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure state that an action
that survives the death of a plaintiff shall not abate, but will survive
146
to the substituted representative.
Rule 25.01 applies to the
147
substitution of parties after an action has been commenced. But
144. MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (2006) (stating that recovery in wrongful death
action is for “the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin”).
145. SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 16, § 1:13.
146. MINN. R. CIV. P. 25.01.
147. See DAVID HERR & ROGER HAYDOCK, MINN. PRACTICE SERIES, CIVIL RULES
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Rule 25.01 does not set forth a specific timeframe for bringing a
148
It is a generally accepted practice for
motion for substitution.
attorneys in Minnesota to file such a motion for substitution within
149
a “reasonable time” after the death of the party.
According to Rule 25.01, the party requesting substitution
must serve the other parties as provided in Rule 5 and give proper
150
notice of hearing in accordance with Rule 4.
Additionally, the
Rule does not state who may bring the motion, making it difficult
for any party to argue prejudice by failure of the other to seek
151
substitution.
Rule 25.01 deals with only half of the problem—the district
court. It does not deal with the issue of who should be appointed
as the personal representative on behalf of the decedent. By
statute, this step is required before anything further can happen on
152
the action once a party dies. The person being substituted in the
action in district court should be the personal representative as
appointed by the probate court. But these actions do not happen
simultaneously, which means that there will be a time when there is
no party to the action in district court. And though parties may
expect an attorney for the deceased party to notify the court and
opposing parties, of the death, there is no requirement for the
153
lawyer to do so.
The death of a plaintiff is not the only issue affecting the
ANNOTATED 1, at 571 (4th ed. 2006). Rule 3.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure states that an action is commenced when the summons is served on the
defendant or date of acknowledgement of mail service or service delivered by the
sheriff. MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01.
148. MINN. R. CIV. P. 25.01. Minnesota does not follow the federal rule
requiring a motion for substitution to be made within ninety days of the
suggestion of death. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 25.01).
149. Id. It has been determined that courts have discretion in determining the
definition of “reasonable” related to the substitution of a party following death.
See generally Willoughby v. St. Paul German Ins. Co., 80 Minn. 432, 83 N.W. 377
(1900); Hunt v. Hoerr, 78 Minn. 281, 80 N.W. 1120 (1899). In Bisson v. Estate of
Dean ex. rel. Eller, No. A03-2037, 2004 WL 1615219, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004),
the defendant argued that the estate is not responsible for a claim brought against
it because the respondent did not properly substitute the estate after the
defendant died before the trial. The court ruled that since Rule 25.01 of the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure “does not limit the time within which the
motion to substitute must be made,” the district court properly allowed
substitution two years after the trial ended. Id. (emphasis added).
150. HERR & HAYDOCK, supra note 147, at 570.
151. Id.
152. See supra Part IV.
153. HERR & HAYDOCK, supra note 147, at 570.
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survivability of an action. What happens if the defendant to an
action brought under section 573.01 dies? Courts have stated that
a cause of action does not exist in the abstract, but against
154
somebody.
Therefore, a civil action can only be commenced by
155
serving a summons on the defendant.
In the absence of statutes to the contrary, the death of the
156
defendant will abate a cause of action.
Some jurisdictions hold
that the death of the defendant terminates any right of recovery
157
unless the statute expressly provides that such action survives.
Other jurisdictions claim that the statutes intend to provide
compensation to the plaintiff regardless of whether the defendant
158
survives the action.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled that it is proper to
make a distinction between proceedings brought against an
159
individual on one hand, and those against his estate on the other.
By virtue of the survivorship statute, a claim against a decedent may
be brought against the personal representative of the decedent’s
160
estate.
Once a personal representative has been appointed on
behalf of the decedent’s estate, all proceedings to enforce the
claim are governed by section 524.3-104 of the Minnesota
161
Statutes.
If a party dies before the commencement or completion of an
action, the attorney is forced to negotiate a perplexing maze of
probate and survival statutes. Rule 4.03 of the Minnesota Rules of
Civil Procedure, which governs the service of process on an
individual, is silent regarding service upon a deceased individual or
162
his estate.
If the defendant dies before the lawsuit is

154. See, e.g., Wood v. Martin, 328 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Minn. 1983).
155. MINN. R. CIV. P. 3.01.
156. See 25A C.J.S. Death § 17 (2006). See also 1 C.J.S. Abatement and Revival
§ 147 (stating specifically that tort actions were considered to be for the
punishment of the wrongdoer, so that if he died, his personal representative could
not be prosecuted for the wrong committed by the deceased).
157. 22A AM. JUR. 2D Death § 12 (2006).
158. Id.
159. Wood, 328 N.W.2d at 724–25 (citing Poepping v. Lindemann, 268 Minn.
30, 35, 127 N.W.2d 512, 516 (1964)) (ruling that an action brought by a wife
against her husband “survives” against his estate in the event of his death).
160. MINN. STAT. § 524.3-104 (2006) (stating an action to enforce a claim
against a decedent’s estate, or his successors, may not be revived or commenced
until a personal representative has been appointed).
161. Id.
162. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.01.
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163

commenced, the claim generally abates.
But according to the
164
an action may still be brought against the
survival statute,
165
personal representative of the decedent’s estate.
As previously
explained, a personal representative is defined as someone who
qualifies to serve as such, is appointed by the court, and accepts the
166
appointment.
Because the personal representative has the
capacity to be sued, he becomes the proper defendant for claims
167
against the decedent’s estate.
Minnesota law states that an action may not be revived against
a decedent’s successors until a personal representative has been
168
appointed.
What is the procedure for commencing (thus
serving) an action against a decedent when no personal
representative has been appointed? In circumstances where
prompt action is required to guard and preserve an estate before a
personal representative being appointed, a special administrator
169
may be appointed in the interim.
According to statute, an
170
appointment may be made informally or formally.
If there is no urgency to the appointment, the court may, after
notice and hearing, require a formal proceeding for appointment
171
of the special administrator.
In the event of an emergency, the
172
notice requirement may be waived or altered by the court. But in
order to appoint a special administrator, the court must find that it
is “necessary to preserve the estate or secure its proper
173
administration.”
163. Zahler v. Manning, 295 N.W.2d 511, 513 n.2 (Minn. 1980).
164. See discussion supra Part III.
165. MINN. STAT. § 573.01 (2006). See discussion supra Part III.
166. MINN. STAT. § 524.3-602 (2006).
167. Van Slooten v. Estate of Schneider-Janzen, 623 N.W.2d 269, 271 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the decedent’s spouse was not properly served when
he was not appointed as a personal representative).
168. MINN. STAT. § 524.3-104 (2006). See also Van Slooten, 623 N.W.2d at 271
(stating that an attempt to commence a personal injury action against an auto
driver who died was ineffective as served against the deceased’s husband when no
personal representative had been appointed).
169. MINN. STAT. § 524.3-614 (2006).
170. Id. An informal appointment is done by filing an application with the
Probate Registrar who then makes the appointment “when necessary to protect
the estate of the decedent.” Id. § 524.3-614, subdiv. 1. Informal appointment
must be made before the appointment of a personal representative, requires no
notice, and grants the special administrator all the same powers to handle the
estate as a personal representative. Id. § 524.3-614, subdiv. 2.
171. Id. § 524.3-614, subdiv. 2.
172. Id.
173. Id. The formally appointed administrator is not required to account for
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The proper procedure is to request the probate court to
appoint a special administrator and then to serve him with notice
of the action. Of course, this assumes the party bringing suit knows
the defendant died before service.
2.

Federal Procedure

In analyzing an issue, it is helpful to look to other jurisdictions
for guidance. But no other state has a procedure governing the
interplay of the district court and probate court in survival actions.
Therefore, this Note addresses the procedure followed by the
federal courts as a comparison to Minnesota’s procedure for
survival actions.
A substitution of parties is authorized in an action in federal
174
court where a party dies and the claim is not extinguished.
The
death must be “suggested upon the record” so that the action
175
proceeds against or in favor of the surviving party.
The federal courts have rules governing the substitution of
176
parties subsequent to a death.
If a party dies but the claim
survives, the court may order substitution of parties upon proper
motion made no later than ninety days after the death is suggested
177
on the record.
Courts have been forced to decide what
constitutes a suggestion of death which would trigger the ninety178
day period.

assets to a general administrator as is required of the informally appointed special
administrator. Id.
174. FED. R. CIV. P. 25(a)(1). A survival action is governed by the survival
statute of the state in which the action arose. In re Daniel’s Estate, 208 Minn. 420,
426, 294 N.W. 465, 468 (1940).
175. FED. R. CIV. P. 25.
176. Id.
177. Id. 25(a)(1). Until 1963, federal procedure required a substitution to be
made within two years starting from the time of death, otherwise the action was
dismissed as to the deceased party. Benjamin Kaplan, Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961–1963 (II), 77 HARV. L. REV. 801, 806–07 (1964)
(emphasis added). But requiring a substitution within a specific time dating from
the death could cause hardship to the deceased’s action. Id. For instance, the
party’s death may not come to the attention of the other party or to his own
counsel. Id. at 807. And the penalty of dismissal may be out of proportion to the
offense. Id.
178. Al-Jundi v. Rockefeller, 8 F.R.D. 244 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that
suggestion of death was insufficient, as it failed to list names of executors to the
estate); but see Yonofsky v. Wernick, 362 F. Supp. 1005, 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(ruling that suggestion of death was sufficient, despite failure to identify person to
be substituted).
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VI. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdictional and Procedural Issues Involving Actions Pending Under
Minnesota’s Survival Statute
The difference in jurisdiction between probate and district
courts leads to a gap in adjudicating survival actions. This occurs
because the original action was filed in, and is governed by, the
district court. But administering the deceased’s estate, which
includes the surviving lawsuit, appears to be the exclusive
jurisdiction of the probate court. Courts have stated that when a
court of competent jurisdiction obtains jurisdiction of both the
subject matter and the parties to a cause, “its authority continues
179
until the matter is finally disposed of.” No other court is at liberty
to interfere with such action.
Therefore, the Minnesota Supreme Court has reiterated the
principle that once an action is before the district court, the
180
probate court cannot interfere and vice versa. And the court has
ruled that the exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of the deceased
enjoyed by the probate court is “inclusive of both settlement and
181
the determination of the person to whom property passes.”
Due to this disparity in jurisdictions, those left behind to
continue an action on behalf of the deceased are confronted with
an untenable situation. The action cannot continue in district
182
court until the probate court appoints a personal representative.
179. Shapiro v. Larson, 206 Minn. 440, 444, 289 N.W. 48, 50 (1939).
180. See generally Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 10, 53 N.W.2d 809 (1952).
Since the probate court has exclusive original jurisdiction to adjudicate
and determine whether a person qualifies as an heir, devisee, or legatee
who may lawfully take a share of a deceased person's estate, it follows that
the district court is wholly without such original jurisdiction and may not,
by injunction or otherwise, impair or otherwise interfere with the probate
court's original exercise thereof. In the settlement and distribution of the
estates of deceased persons, the district court has only appellate
jurisdiction, with the sole exception that it may exercise a purely ancillary
jurisdiction to aid (but not to controvert or obstruct) the probate court in
the performance of its proper functions in those special cases where,
without such aid, the probate court would manifestly be unable to afford
an adequate remedy for an alleged wrong to the estate, the heirs,
legatees, or creditors.
Id. at 13–14, 53 N.W.2d at 812 (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 13, 53 N.W.2d at 811 (citing In re Estate of Peterson, 202 Minn. 31,
277 N.W. 529 (Minn. 1938)).
182. See supra Part IV for a discussion of probate and district court jurisdiction.
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If the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over this process, how
does the district court learn about the death or decide how the
action should continue? By whom, on behalf of whom, and on
what timeline does the action continue?
This confusion is unique to survival actions because wrongful
death actions are not created until the death of the injured party.
It is the death that created the action, which means the wrongful
death lawsuit is filed and adjudicated completely in district court.
In addition, Rule 144 of the Minnesota Rules of General Practice
exists to make the path of a wrongful death suit easier to discern by
183
all parties involved in the action.
Minnesota law has adopted the federal procedure for
substitution of parties after death, but neglected to enact any
procedure for attorneys or courts to follow with regard to survival
actions. The lack of a clear procedure, and the resulting
confusion, not only leads to further litigation but also creates a
situation in which an attorney could be disciplined for violating the
rules of professional conduct.
B. Issues Related to Attorney’s Actions as Governed by the Rules of
Professional Conduct
The Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by Minnesota,
govern the actions of attorneys practicing in this state. Most lawyers
practice with an eye toward following these rules while working to
diligently resolve a matter for their clients. But the lack of
procedure governing the proper handling of a survival action puts
an attorney at risk of discipline for violating the rules.
An attorney is required to act with “reasonable diligence and
184
promptness” when representing a client.
Minnesota Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.3, requires an attorney to pursue the
client’s matter despite “opposition, obstruction, or personal
inconvenience to the lawyer” and to act with commitment and zeal
185
on behalf of the client. Rule 1.3 also requires a lawyer to carry a
matter “through to conclusion” unless she is terminated by the
186
client.
183. See supra Part V.A.
184. MINN. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2005).
185. Id. See also In re Anderson, 546 N.W.2d 298, 298 (Minn. 1996) (giving
attorney public reprimand and two-year supervised probation for neglecting a
legal matter).
186. MINN. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2005).
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Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.4, states that
a lawyer shall promptly inform the client of any circumstance
requiring the client’s consent, consult with the client regarding
objectives, and keep the client reasonably informed about the
187
status of the matter.
How does an attorney comply with these
rules if he does not have a client—or is unsure who the client is?
The rule requires the lawyer to promptly consult with the client on
188
decisions deemed to be the province of the client. When a lawyer
receives a settlement offer from opposing counsel, he is required to
promptly inform the client regarding whether to accept such
189
offer.
This is not possible if the client has died and no personal
representative has been appointed to represent the decedent. The
situation is further complicated by the fact that there is no set
timeframe in which the probate court must appoint a personal
representative. There is no guidance for an attorney handling a
claim after his client dies but before a personal representative, or
new client, has been appointed. The attorney is caught between
the jurisdiction of the district court, which is unable to handle
matters related to the deceased client’s estate, including the
lawsuit, and the probate court, which is now required to become
involved in a matter properly before the district court by
appointing a “new client” before the claim may proceed.
Attorneys have reason to fear sanctions when handling survival
actions: attorneys who have been found in violation of the
professional rules when handling probate matters have been
190
subject to discipline. While death of the client would most likely
be considered a mitigating factor in a case where an attorney has
been brought up on disciplinary charges, she would still incur the
damage of having to defend the claim. A specific procedure
governing such actions would insulate her from this possibility by
giving her a specific path to follow after her client dies.
VII. A PROCEDURE THAT WILL RESOLVE THE ISSUE
A survival action is for the benefit of the estate of the

187. Id. R. 1.3.
188. Id. R. 1.4 cmt.
189. Id.
190. In re Ruhland, 689 N.W.2d 167, 168 (Minn. 2004) (upholding sanction
giving attorney public reprimand and two-year probation for failing to act with
diligence or adequately communicate with client in probate matter).
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191

deceased. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that there is no
reason why an estate that has suffered an injury should not be
compensated, whether or not the injured party survives the
192
outcome of the trial.
Since the deceased party filed the lawsuit
and continued to pursue it until death intervened, it logically
follows she would want to see it to conclusion. This assumption
calls for enacting a procedure to facilitate the continuation of the
action until it has been satisfactorily concluded for her benefit. The
decedent cannot speak for herself, so it is up to her lawyer to speak
193
for her and handle the matter upon her death. It is possible that
only her lawyer will be aware of the deceased client’s goals with
regard to the action, so he should be given the opportunity to
convey those wishes to whoever is appointed personal
representative. An official procedure by which the action is
continued, both in probate and district court, will allow for the
possibility that the deceased client’s wishes with regard to the
action will be honored.
In order to assist practitioners in dealing with the jurisdictional
194
issues between district court and probate court when handling a
survival action, Minnesota should adopt the following procedure.
The procedure would require the deceased’s attorney to file a
“death notification” simultaneously with both the probate court
195
and the district court in which the original action is being heard.
Further, the procedure would require the attorney to file such
196
notification within ninety days of learning of the client’s death.
While this does place responsibility for handling the matter with
the attorney, it is possible that he may be the only person who
191. See SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 16, § 1:13.
192. See Johnson v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 608, 612 (Minn.
1988)
193. The author recognizes that some deceased parties to pending litigation
may be acting pro se. But a procedure assisting in such a matter is beyond the
scope of this Note.
194. See discussion supra Part IV.
195. Under Minnesota law, while the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction in
determining how decedents’ estates are to be administered, probate court also has
concurrent jurisdiction of “any other action” to which an estate, “through a personal
representative,” may be a party. MINN. STAT. § 524.3-105 (2006) (emphasis
added). Therefore, it will not violate statutory law to enact a procedure requiring
the district court and probate court to work together in handling a survival action.
Id.
196. Requiring the attorney to file within ninety days of learning of his client’s
death will avoid the issues associated with instituting a deadline, such as that
discussed in footnote 177, commencing with the death itself.
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knows about both the lawsuit and the death, so he should be
entrusted with the task of at least allowing the lawsuit to proceed if
197
and when a personal representative is appointed.
Under the
Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, an attorney is already
198
required to maintain communication with a client. Therefore, if
the attorney is handling the matter properly there should not be
too much of a delay in learning of the death.
While Minnesota does have a policy for substituting a deceased
party in a lawsuit, there is no procedural deadline for filing the
199
substitution of party.
The courts allow the filing to take place
200
within a “reasonable time.” But the “reasonable time” standard is
relatively vague and does not provide clear guidance to attorneys
201
handling such matters. A “hard” deadline of ninety days in which
an attorney must simultaneously notify the district and probate
courts of the death will then trigger a timeframe in which the
parties must file the Rule 25.01 substitution required by the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Once the attorney files the
notice of death, he, and the party he represents, would have sixty
days to file a substitution of party. Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 25.01, requires notice to be served upon all parties
to the action. Therefore, under the procedure described above,
the district court and the parties to the action are on notice that a
party died, the court was informed of the death, and the party
suffering the loss is dealing with the matter.
The procedure takes the additional step of informing the
probate court of the necessity of appointing a personal
197. The procedure should also clearly state the compensation to which an
attorney handling such an action is entitled. Since there is no clear “client” in a
survival action, the attorney is at risk of being unable to collect fees for time spent
on the matter. The procedure shall state that the attorney is to be fairly
compensated by the estate of the deceased until such time as a personal
representative is appointed. Once a personal representative is appointed, he will
become the client and the attorney will again have a proper “party” from whom he
may obtain proper compensation.
198. MINN. RULES PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2005).
199. MINN. R. CIV. P. 25.01.
200. Id. See generally Willoughby v. St. Paul German Ins. Co., 80 Minn. 432,
437, 83 N.W. 377, 379 (1900) (denying appellants’ claim that court should have
denied substitution due to creditors’ delay in making their application for
substitution and noting that timeframe to make application is within the court’s
discretion).
201. This was demonstrated in Bisson v. Estate of Dean ex. rel. Eller, in which the
appellate court allowed substitution two years after the trial ended. No. A03-2037,
2004 WL 1615219, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. July 20, 2004).
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representative to handle the matter in the deceased’s “absence.”
The district court, upon learning of a party’s death, shall issue an
order to the survivors to the suit to submit a motion to the probate
court to appoint a personal representative within thirty days of
receiving the substitution of party notice. Since it is entirely
possible that the probate court will not appoint a personal
representative within thirty days, filing a motion to have one
appointed within the deadline will avoid the default deadline to file
for a substitution. A personal representative must be appointed
202
before the district court will grant a motion for substitution.
If
the motion for substitution that is required to be filed with the
district court under Rule 25.01 must be done within sixty days of
filing the notice of death, the thirty-day deadline to file for the
appointment of a personal representative is fair to allow the
probate court to be in step with the district court.
If the survivors to the suit cannot timely agree on a personal
representative, the probate court has the power to appoint a special
203
administrator.
Generally, the duties of the special administrator
204
Because
are described as those of the personal representative.
the probate court has the ability to appoint either the personal
representative or the special administrator, the main procedural
issue in a survival action is the separate jurisdictions of the probate
205
and district courts.
The stalemate created when a party dies during a lawsuit is
analogous to a claim pending when a corporation files for
bankruptcy. According to bankruptcy law, once a corporation files
206
for protection, an automatic stay goes into effect. The automatic
stay under bankruptcy law is a temporary injunction which prevents
207
creditors from taking further action to recover their property.
The stay acts to preserve the status quo of the “deceased
corporation” at the time bankruptcy was filed (or the “party died”)
and is “intended to give debtors a breathing spell to put their

202. MINN. R. CIV. P. 25.01.
203. MINN. STAT. § 524.3-614 (2006). Minnesota law states that the person
named as executor in the will is to be named as the special administrator. Id.
§ 524.3-615.
204. Id. § 524.3-616 (stating that the special administrator must manage and
preserve the assets of the estate).
205. See supra Part IV.
206. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000).
207. Timothy P. Branigan & Lawrence D. Coppel, Pitfalls for the Unwary: When
to File a Bankruptcy Case, 35-0ct. MD. B. J. 24, 26 (2002).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss3/1

34

Tymchuck: Note: A Procedural Quagmire: How to Proceed with an Action in Min
14. TYMCHUCK - RC.DOC

2007]

4/10/2007 1:06:23 PM

WHEN A CLIENT DIES EN PENDENTE LITE

1221

208

financial affairs in order.”
The procedure described in the beginning of this section to
assist attorneys and parties in handling survival actions should act
in the same manner as the automatic stay does in bankruptcy
actions. By preserving the status quo of a lawsuit, such a rule allows
the parties a “breathing spell” to take stock of the lawsuit and the
next steps to take when a party dies. The survivors to the suit
should be given a reasonable amount of time to assess the
deceased’s claim and decide whether to pursue it further and
whom to appoint as the personal representative. It is possible that
the heirs of the deceased knew nothing, or very little, about the
pending claim and should be given the proper “breathing room” to
make an informed decision on whether to pursue the action.
But the district court should also be kept informed of the new
situation. Generally this is done by filing a motion to substitute
209
parties.
The motion to substitute requires a personal
representative to be appointed as the substitute for the deceased
210
party.
Therefore, if a personal representative has not yet been
appointed—which is highly likely, as this requires the cooperation
of the probate court—a motion for substitution cannot be filed
with the district court. As previously described, the probate court
does have the authority to appoint a special administrator to
handle the deceased’s matters until a personal representative is
211
appointed.
This does not resolve the issue of having two courts
with separate jurisdictions involved in the matter. There is no
timeframe in which the probate court must appoint the special
212
administrator. As a result, the attorneys and parties to the action
are still in limbo while waiting for the probate court to act. A
procedure that acts to immediately preserve the status quo upon
the death of a party would alleviate the pressure felt while waiting
for the probate court to act. Requiring the deceased’s attorney to
file a simultaneous motion notifying both the probate and district
courts within ninety days of the death of the party would ensure
that the two courts are on the same page with regard to the status
of the lawsuit. The probate court should then immediately appoint
a special administrator to allow the matter to effectively be “stayed”
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
MINN. R. CIV. P. 25.01(a).
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 524.3-614 (2006).
See id.
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until the proper personal representative is appointed.
The Bankruptcy Code states that in order to remove the
213
automatic stay, a hearing must be held within thirty days.
This
reduces unnecessary delay and forces the parties involved to handle
a matter they may otherwise ignore or allow to expire. A “dead
corporation” most likely has no more motivation to handle a
“lingering” claim against it than does a third party to handle a
214
survival action on behalf of a dead person. If a party to a survival
action wants to “remove” the court-appointed personal
representative, it must file a motion before both the probate court
and the district court seeking removal. But a party should not
simply seek the removal of the court appointed representative but
should simultaneously file a motion to appoint a new one. This will
force the party to handle the matter in a quick and efficient
manner.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, “any willful violation of a stay
215
provided by this section shall recover actual damages.” Sanctions
serve as an additional method of forcing parties to deal in a proper
manner with each other and the courts in the absence of an
original “party.” Similarly, Minnesota’s procedure for handling a
survival action should include sanctions against a party who
attempts to move the action forward without utilizing the proper
procedure. If a party learns of another party’s death during the
action and attempts to improperly settle the matter (e.g., settling
with the estate instead of the properly appointed personal
representative), or files discovery with the district court in an
attempt to gain an underhanded advantage, the party, and the
attorney, should be sanctioned accordingly. The policy for having
a procedure governing survival actions is to assist the deceased’s
attorney, since the client can no longer speak for himself.
Therefore, an attempt to take advantage of the death by the
opposing party should be dealt with through appropriate sanctions.
This would give attorneys a clear path to follow and allow them
216
to avoid possibility of violating Rules of Professional Conduct.

213. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(B) (2000).
214. If the deceased is a defendant in a lawsuit, the heirs will most likely have
even less motivation to be appointed as the personal representative to defend
against the claim.
215. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1).
216. See supra Part V.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that the legislature
has the authority to regulate the practices of the probate court as
long as it does not deprive the court of its constitutional
217
jurisdiction.
Therefore, it is not a violation to enact rules to
govern the procedure of an action after a client dies. A concrete
procedure would give Minnesota practitioners a clear path to
follow in working toward a beneficial conclusion for their deceased
clients.
The procedure outlined in this Note allows all parties involved
to be notified in a timely manner of the death of a party. In
addition, it puts both the district and probate courts on notice of
the death and of the need to substitute parties. This allows both
courts to ensure that the status quo of the lawsuit is preserved
pending the appointment of the proper personal representative.
The emergency appointment of a representative to appear on
behalf of the deceased client prevents the matter from defaulting
due to inaction. And the opposing party still has the opportunity
to settle the matter by negotiating with the personal representative
appointed by the court, with the court having final approval of the
settlement. No other jurisdiction has enacted rules specific to
handling a survival action. Thus, Minnesota has an opportunity to
act as a model for the rest of the country.

217. State ex rel. Preis v. O’Brien, 186 Minn. 432, 433, 243 N.W. 434, 435
(1932).
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